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Part 1 Background Introduction 
The authors welcome the Legal and Constitutional Affairs Committee's inquiry into the 
Adequacy and Efficacy of Australia's Anti-Money Laundering and Counter-Terrorism 
Financing Regime. This submission relates to term of reference a): 
The extent to which the Australian Transaction Reports and Analysis 
Centre: 
i. responds to and relies upon reporting by designated services, and 
ii. identifies emerging problems based on this reporting. 
i. The extent to which AUSTRAC responds to and relies upon providers 
of designated services 
i. The Extent to Which AUSTRAC Responds to 
and Relies upon Providers of Designated 
Services 
The Anti-Money Laundering and Counter-Terrorism Financing Act 2006 (Cth) 
(AML/CTF Act) defines the providers of designated services1 as reporting entities2. 
Reporting entities are the primary source of transaction reports that the Austral ian 
Transaction Reports and Analysis Centre (AUSTRAC) collects and analyses. 
In determining the extent to which AUSTRAC responds to reporting entities, it is useful 
to consider the relevant statutory requirements. One of the objects of the AML/CTF 
Act3 is that the AML regime gives effect to the 40 Recommendations of the Financial 
Action Task Force (FATF).4 Recommendation 34 states that regulatory authorities, 
1 See section 6 of the AML/CTF Act. 
2 See section 5 of the AML/CTF Act. 
3 See section 3( 3) of the AML/CTF Act. 
4 Financia l Action Task Force International Standards on Combatting Money Laundering 
and the Financing of Terrorism and Proliferation; the FATF Recommendations 2012 
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such as AUSTRAC, should provide feedback to assist financial institutions and 
designated non-financial businesses and professions (DNFBPs) in applying national 
measures to combat money laundering and terrorist financing, and, in particu lar, in 
detecting and reporting suspicious transactions.5 Hence, the recommendations 
establish the standards. 
In 2015 the FATF provided the latest Mutual Evaluation Report (MER) on Australia. 
These reports assess compliance with the standards. The FATF comprehensively 
assessed Australia's AML regime including AUSTRAC's compliance with 
Recommendation 34 and the quality of its regulatory supervision. The FATF found that 
AUSTRAC's feedback to reporting entities is mainly general. The feedback is 
published annually in AUSTRAC's Typologies and Case Studies' reports. FATF 
described these reports as containing "sanitised examples of actual cases ... as well 
as general areas of deficiency (e.g., late reporting, insufficient detail in certain fields) ... " 
Further, and more importantly, the FATF noted the limited guidance AUSTRAC makes 
available for identifying high risk customers or situations. Moreover, it stated that "none 
of the guidance applies to DNFBPs".6 In response, the FATF recommended that 
AUSTRAC "Enhance the utility and timeliness of feedback provided to reporting 
entities" to enable the entities to better understand the real ML/TF risks of their 
activities. 7 
Improving the timeliness of feedback is likely to be problematic for AUSTRAC. 
AUSTRAC explains that feedback is annual because of production timeframe. It refers 
to its review and clearance processes from within the organisation and of those of the 
updated June 2021 https://www.fatf-
gafi.org/pu blications/f atf recommendations/ docu ments/fatf-recom mendatio ns. htm I 
5 Financial Action Task Force International Standards on Combatting Money Laundering 
and the Financing of Terrorism and Proliferation; the FATF Recommendations 2012 
updated June 2021 see page 26 https://www.fatf-
gafi.org/pu blications/f atf recommendations/ docu ments/fatf-recom mendatio ns. htm I. 
6 Financial Action Task Force and Asia Pacific Group 2015 Mutual Evaluation Report; Anti -
Money Laundering Measures in Australia p 174 at paragraphs a6.25 and a6.26 
7 Financial Action Task Force and Asia Pacific Group 2015 Mutual Evaluation Report; Anti -
Mone Launderin Measures in Australia 103 at ara ra h 6.33. 
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partner agencies mentioned in the sanitised cases. The sanitisation of case studies by 
AUSTRAC further reduces the effectiveness of the feedback because it strips it of 
meaningful context and useful details.8 
In terms of the FATF's criticism of AUSTRAC's failure to provide guidance to ON FBPs, 
AUSTRAC began releasing a series of publications called Strategic Analysis Briefs. In 
developing the Briefs, AUSTRAC is assisted by the Department of Home Affairs 
(OHS), previously the Transnational Crime Branch of the Attorney-General's 
Department. The DHA provides research and policy support. The Briefs refer to cases 
of DNFBP involvement in serious and organised crime. One such Brief is entitled, 
Money Laundering through Legal Practitioners. This Brief provides limited guidance 
because of the cases referred to. 
The cases are problematic for several reasons. All the cases had crucial details 
omitted. For instance, some were not Australian, while others were dated, that is, they 
preceded the creation of the AML/CTF Act. Another case was a hypothetical construct, 
but it was also presented as an actual case. In all these cases, the omitted detai ls 
obscured their identification as incongruous, unsuitable, and not fit for purpose. 
The central problem with AUSTRAC's failure to provide a single case in the domestic 
context is that th is is inconsistent with its claim that DNFBPs pose a high risk of 
involvement in money laundering. The Law Council of Australia communicated its 
concerns about th is inconsistency to AUSTRAC's senior management soon after the 
publication of the Brief in 2016. Some five years later, in 2021, the Brief disappeared 
from AUSTRAC's website. However, AUSTRAC has not made a statement 
acknowledging the withdrawal of the Brief or given reasons for its disappearance. 
This is relevant for several reasons. While the now discredited Brief is absent from the 
AUSTRAC website, it continues to be relied upon by unwitting 3rd parties in Australia 
and beyond. This is problematic because the failure to disclose its removal, means the 
8 Austral ian National Audit Office, Report No 47 2012-13 AUSTRAC's Administration of Its 
Financial Intelligence Function page 76-77. 
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Brief continues to provide credibility and underpin other research publ ications, such as 
those generated by the Australian Institute of Criminology.9 Where such publications 
build on other 'research find ings', such as with the weak evidence produced by 
perception surveys 1°, the resu lt creates a house of cards effect. This distorts the factual 
reality avai lable to advance effective pol icy. Like 'fake news', the risk is that the 
misinformation affects further discussion in th is area by distorting subsequent 
perspectives on the issues. 
ii. The Extent to Which AUSTRAC Identifies 
Emerging Problems 
AUSTRAC has dual functions. These are to regulate reporting entities and ensure their 
compliance with the AMUCTF Act and to operate as Australia's financial intell igence 
unit. In 2013, the Australian National Audit Office (ANAO) conducted an audit of 
AUSTRAC's financial intelligence function .11 One aspect of this function involves 
receiving financial transaction reports from reporting entities and analysing them to 
identify patterns and trends. The audit assessed the effectiveness with which 
AUSTRAC processes such reports.12 
At the time, AUSTRAC's TRAQ database contained all the financial transaction reports 
provided to the organisation. The monitoring system of the TRAQ database used an 
automated TarglT system. The TarglT applied 'rules' that generated 'hits' to make 
initial determinations about triaging and the suggested priority by which hits relating to 
transaction reports should be processed by human analysts. 
9 See for instance the Austra lian Government 's Australian Institute of Criminology 
Research Report 10; Organised Crime Research in Australia 2018-in particular Chapter 
14 https://www.aic.gov.au/sites/default/fi1es/2020-05/rr10 for online 0.pdf 
10 See for e.g. , Perceptions of money laundering and financing of terrorism in a sample of 
t he Austra lian legal profession in 2008-09 {a ic.gov.au) 
11 Austra lian Nationa l Aud it Office, AUSTRAC's Administration Of Its Financial Intelligence 
Function; Audit Report No 47 2012-2013 available at 
https://www.anao.gov. au/sites/g/files/net616/f /2012 l 3% 20Audit% 20Report% 20No% 20 
47.pdf 
12 ANAO f 131. 
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The ANAO found that a significant number of hits remained unassessed for too long. 
AUSTRAC was unable to process the volume of hits being generated . This was the 
case despite the 'rules' having been redefined in February 2012, which significantly 
reduced the hits. Nevertheless, ANAO found that 95% of hits remained unassessed 
for more than two months. Paradoxically, AUSTRAC requires reporting entities to 
submit certain f inancial reports within 24 hours. 
The more urgent Suspicious Matter Reports (SMR) also went into the TRAQ database. 
These were categorised based on specific risk classifications defined in business rules. 
Incoming SMRs were triaged as received. However, the ANAO found that the volume 
of SMRs was such that they could not all be evaluated daily as intended. The backlogs 
of SMRs/SUSTRs created, persisted the entire audit period (from July 2011 to 
February 2013). The ANAO found the backlog included 6385 unassessed 
SMRs/SUSTRs that had been classified as of a very high or high significance. 
Statistically, it is likely that at least some of these reports would have concerned 
terrorism financing offences, chi ld exploitation, or other matters of such gravity. A 
further 7247 unassessed records were rated as being of moderate significance.13 
Together these constituted around 19% of the unassessed SM Rs. The report does not 
mention the overall number of unassessed SMRs that were awaiting evaluation. 
The AUSTRAC aimed to process 90% of the SMRs it received within five days. Despite 
this, the ANAO found that over the eighteen-month audit period, on average, only 
57.7% of SMRs were processed within five days. At times, the actual processing rate 
fell as low as 44%. The 90% within five days target was never met. Apart from not 
meeting its target times, AUSTRAC did not escalate these backlogs to management 
in a systematic way. 
The ANAO report made three recommendations. One recommendation 
(Recommendation 2) was that AUSTRAC establishes and monitors its performance 
against processing times, and that it monitors and reports backlogs to management to 
bring attention to delays in assessing higher priority financial reports.14 AUSTRAC 
13 ANAO [3.18]. 
14 ANAO f3.60l. 
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agreed.15 It assured the ANAO that its new EAC system would provide more 
sophisticated tools for managing and analysing large data volumes. The system would 
also give AUSTRAC the capabil ity to establ ish new performance targets for monitoring 
and reporting on the processing of data and other tasks. 
In July 2021, the authors made a Freedom of Information appl ication to AUSTRAC 
seeking information on whether the system addresses the issues raised by 
Recommendation 2 for the period between July 2015 to February 201716. Specifically, 
we sought any updated information on AUSTRAC's performance against processing 
times for financial transaction reports; processing backlogs for key financial intell igence 
types; and the frequency and nature of reporting to management on processing times; 
and, where relevant, the reasons why processing targets are not being met. 
The AUSTRAC responded in August 2021. It stated that following its searches to 
identify the requested documents, none were identified as falling within the scope of 
our FOi request. It indicated that it then conducted a broader search for any documents 
that might fall w ithin the scope of the ANAO analysis. None were found or provided. 
One conclusion that could be drawn from th is, is that there does not appear to be a 
means of following up on progress made against the ANAO's recommendations. 
Consequently, AUSTRAC's commitment to make the recommended changes cannot 
be tested or verified. 
Conclusion 
The Committee's Term of Reference (a) asks about reliance and reporting between 
AUSTRAC and reporting entities, and the identification of emerging problems based 
on financial reports. The AUSTRAC, as a national regulator, has been found by the 
FATF to be wanting in providing guidance to reporting entities about high-risk 
customers or situations. The FATF also found that AUSTRAC provided no guidance 
that applies to DNFBPs. Presumably AUSTRAC developed the Strategic Analysis Brief 
15 ANAO [3 .61] . 
16 This period was selected to give AUSTRAC opportunity to begin addressing the ANAO 
Recommendation 2 and to imbed its new IT system. 
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series to provide guidance to DNFBPs. The authors analysed the Brief relating to legal 
practitioners and observed that using unsuitable or fictitious cases, without AUSTRAC 
disclosing this, was disingenuous, and misleading. Given the sudden disappearance 
of the Brief for legal practitioners from AUSTRAC's website, it may well remain the 
case that there is no guidance, at least for legal practitioners. Moreover, individuals 
and organisations that rely on the authoritativeness of the AUSTRAC Brief also risk 
being discredited . 
As for the emerging problems to be analysed based on the reporting received by 
AUSTRAC, we make the following observations. There does not appear to be any 
evidence that AUSTRAC has followed up on the 2013 recommendations made by the 
ANAO in its investigation of its operations. It is our understanding that since 2012, the 
earlier fund ing arrangements and resourcing restraints that AUSTRAC may have been 
experiencing at that time, have since been resolved. This raises the question as to 
whether the issues identified by the ANAO have been addressed . For instance, are 
there mechanisms to ensure that performance against processing times of incoming 
transaction reports and processing backlogs are being managed? Unless and until this 
has been rectified, there is no reason to believe that AUSTRAC is in fact identifying 
emerging problems based on the reports it receives, to the fullest extent possible. It is 
our submission that it is incumbent on AUSTRAC to ensure transparency about the 
effectiveness of its governance arrangements. We further submit, that any financial 
crime policy extension should proceed only on rigorous, reliable, and empirical 
evidence. 
Recommendations 
The authors recommend: 
1. Prior to considering extending the AML regime to Tranche 2 entities, the 
Committee should recommend that existing issues with how AUSTRAC 
rel ies and responds to reporting entities be comprehensively and 
independently researched and assessed. The Government must get its 
house in order before it attempts to construct an extension . 
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2. That the Committee recommends that a mechanism is created by which 
ANAO audit recommendations can be followed up on, reported against, and 
that such reports are made publ icly available. By way of example, in Canada 
the Standing Senate Committee on Banking Trade and Commerce 
recommended that improvement of the AML regime could only be achieved 
by critical analysis by an independent body of the performance of the regime. 
This includes its collection of data on for instance the extent to which case 
disclosures by FINTRAC were used in investigations, prosecutions, and 
convictions.17 
17 The March 2013 Canada report from the Banking, Trade and Commerce Committee on 
money laundering can be found at this link: 
htt s: sencanada.ca Content SEN Committee 411 bane re re 10mar13-e. df. 
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